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Unequal Neighbours? A French-German Comparison of Family 
Size Intentions
Kerstin Ruckdeschel, Anne Salles, Sabine Diabaté, Laurent Toulemon, 
Arnaud Régnier-Loilier
Abstract: The neighbouring countries France and Germany show very different 
levels of fertility. Differences also exist between the two regions of East and West 
Germany. The aim of this paper is to help close a remaining gap in explaining these 
differences by applying a cultural concept of role models. Data is based on the Ger-
man survey “Family-related role models” (2012) and the French survey “Situation 
de couple, intentions de fécondité et opinions sur la famille”, ELIPSS (2013) offering 
a new approach to measuring the impact of social norms. The analysis uses multi-
nomial logistic regression. We identifi ed role models regarding the acceptance of 
childlessness on the one hand and large families on the other, as well as regarding 
the link between marriage and parenthood and the importance of fi nancial secu-
rity, suggesting different fertility-related cultures in France and Germany. There is 
a strong predominance of one general role model in France – that of having at least 
two children. In Germany, in contrast, there is a dominant role model – the two child 
family – but there are also several less central role models. The dominant model in 
France even leads to a sort of self-stigmatisation of individuals who want to stay 
childless, whereas childlessness is generally accepted in Germany. Role model dif-
ferences between East and West Germany show a lower acceptance of large fami-
lies and a higher acceptance of single-child families in the East. Our results highlight 
the importance of role models for fertility intentions as well as the relevance of 
cultural dimensions when studying the impact of the institutional framework on 
fertility.
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1 Introduction
With regard to fertility, France and Germany are often cited as two unequal neigh-
bours (e.g. Salles et al. 2010; Fagnani 2002). France is a country with one of the 
highest fertility rates in Europe, while Germany has one of the lowest. This gap is 
usually explained by structural factors, especially work-life balance measures such 
as childcare facilities. Signifi cant research has revealed a link between family policy 
aimed at reconciling work and family life, and the comparatively higher fertility lev-
els in France and the Nordic countries (Gauthier 2007; McDonald 2005; Hantrais 
2004). However, structural factors alone cannot explain the gap between France 
and Germany. The German government has implemented various reforms to help 
women combine work and family starting with the expansion of day-care for chil-
dren under the age of three in 2004 (Bujard 2011). Even though the fertility rate has 
increased in Germany in recent years, it still remains at a comparatively low level. 
Germany is one of the few countries in Europe with a relatively high labour market 
participation of mothers, a rate of small children in day care which is EU average, 
and a low fertility level. In fact, several studies observe a limited effect of policy 
measures on fertility (Luci-Greulich/Thévenon 2013; Toulemon et al. 2008). 
As research shows, cultural aspects additionally explain why the two neighbours 
differ in their fertility structure (Ruckdeschel 2012; Salles et al.2010; Fagnani 2002) 
and could perhaps shed some light on the limited effect of family policy reforms 
in Germany. While there is strong social pressure to become a parent in France 
(Debest/Mazuy 2014), a culture of childlessness seems to be emerging in Germa-
ny (Dorbritz 2008; Sobotka 2008). To a lesser extent, such cultural differences can 
be found within Germany as well, i.e. between East and West Germany. Especially 
regarding norms and practices concerning the work-life balance, East Germany 
seems to have more in common with France than with West Germany (BMFSFJ 
2015). In other words, the differences in fertility outcomes between France, West 
and East Germany might also be linked to “fertility-related norms” (Liefbroer et al. 
2015; Liefbroer/Billari 2010). Social infl uence, defi ned here as the disposition to 
comply with widely accepted social norms, does indeed explain why attitudes to-
wards fertility do not keep pace with social reforms or economic changes. This in 
turn explains why it may take time for family policy reforms to have an impact on 
fertility outcomes (Salles et al. 2010; Rossier/Bernardi 2009). However, examining 
the link between social norms and fertility has proven to be diffi cult because of a 
lack of available data.
The aim of this paper is to close remaining gaps in explaining fertility differences 
by applying a cultural concept of role models.1 In order to analyse the impact of so-
cial norms and social context, we operationalised the concept on both the individual 
and the societal levels. The societal level is included by the new concept of “indi-
vidual perceptions of general opinion”. In the survey we carried out, respondents 
1 These role models refer to “guiding principles”.
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were not only asked about their personal opinion on social norms, but also what 
they believe the broader population expects, in order to compare personal with 
perceived general opinion and to link these opinions to fertility intentions. Using this 
concept, we compare fertility-related role models for childlessness, large families, 
partnership and traditional role models in France and East and West Germany on 
the individual and societal levels. In a second step, we analyse how these different 
role models on the individual and societal levels correlate with intended fi nal parity. 
2 Fertility trends and Family Policy in Germany and France
Fertility Trends
Since the end of World War II, fertility has continuously remained at a higher level 
in France than in Germany. While the gap was widening between 2000 and 2010, 
it is now decreasing with the total fertility rate (TFR) rising slightly in Germany and 
seeming to be slightly declining in France.2 Nevertheless, the total fertility rate is 
currently about 30 percent higher in France than in Germany (see Fig. 1). While the 
total fertility rate was very low in East Germany after reunifi cation, it is now slightly 
Fig. 1: Total fertility rates in France and (unifi ed) Germany, 1960-2016
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2 The decline in the number of births seems to have been accelerating in France since the second 
half of 2014. According to preliminary data, the total fertility rate fell to 1.88 in 2017, compared to 
2.00 in 2014, the lowest level since 1999 (Papon/Beaumel 2018). 
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higher than in West Germany. It is worth pointing out that the TFR is quite volatile 
in the short term, and therefore we avoid statements about future trends. We use 
TFR as a measure because it is the most up-to-date indicator of developments in 
fertility available.
Among other factors, the TFR gap between Germany and France can be ex-
plained by lower childlessness rates and a higher incidence of large families in 
France (Köppen et al. 2017; Kreyenfeld/Konietza 2017; Bujard/Sulak 2016; Hornung 
2011; Prioux 2007). Of all women born between 1968 and 1972, nearly 30 percent 
have three children or more in France, compared to less than 17 percent in Germany 
(see Fig. 2). France also has a lower share of women with a single child.
While the total fertility rate is nearly the same in both parts of Germany, the dis-
tribution of mothers by parity remains quite different. 36 percent of women born 
between 1968 and 1972 have a single child in East Germany, compared to 22 per-
cent in West Germany (and 18 percent compared to France in the case of women 
born in 1970). In East Germany, there are nearly as many women with a single child 
as with two children, but large families with three and more children are rarer. Nev-
ertheless, the total fertility rate is actually slightly higher in the eastern part of the 
country, since childlessness is less common than in West Germany.
Non-marital births are least frequent in West Germany: In 2015, less than 30 per-
cent of births occurred out of wedlock compared to 58 percent in East Germany 
(BiB 2017) and 59 percent in France (Eurostat 2017). This discrepancy may partly be 
Fig. 2: Distribution of German and French women born between 1968 and 
1972 by parity (in %)
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related to family policy. In Germany, fi nancial advantages linked to marriage – e.g. 
tax benefi ts – are much higher than in France. As many women reduce working 
hours after birth or even stop working for some time, marriage provides an impor-
tant factor of fi nancial security for them. However, this also leads to more traditional 
gender roles and income gaps within a relationship. Therefore, we fi nd a strong 
link between marriage and having children, and also between having children and 
adherence to traditional gender roles (Salles 2016; Klärner 2015). In France, married 
couples benefi t from the same incentive (quotient conjugal), but this is softened 
by a family tax splitting rule that includes children (quotient familial), and is not 
limited to married couples, which means that the incentive to marry is lower (Eidel-
man 2013). In East Germany on the other hand, family policy supporting unmarried 
mothers has encouraged parents to have their fi rst child outside marriage and to 
postpone marriage. This trend weakened the link between children and marriage in 
the long term (Klärner 2015; Dorbritz 2008). 
Family Policy
The differences in the demographic situation in the two countries have often been 
linked to family policies, which differ signifi cantly. French family policy has a long 
tradition of supporting large families, which can be related to the low fertility pre-
vailing in France from the late 18th century until the end of World War II. Financial 
support for families increases with the number of children and is especially high 
from the third child onwards. Parental leave is only one year for parents with one 
child, but three years for parents with at least two children,3 whereas there is no 
difference by parity in Germany. Similarly, in France only parents with at least two 
children are entitled to family allowance, which is notably higher for the third child, 
whereas in Germany the allowance is nearly the same for each child. Likewise, the 
French tax-splitting system benefi ts large families as it takes into account the num-
ber of children in the household and assigns greater weight from the third child 
onwards. Large families are also entitled to further child-related fi nancial benefi ts. 
Furthermore, both countries support family-work balance, albeit with some dif-
ferences. France has a long tradition of promoting the reconciliation of work and 
family life through diversifi ed childcare, fi nancial support for external childcare, and 
all-day schooling. But for Germany, this is relatively new – Until the mid-2000s it 
was quite diffi cult for western German mothers to combine work and family. This 
was partly due to low childcare provision for children under the age of three, com-
bined with three years of parental leave, and half-day schooling (Périvier 2004; Fag-
nani 2002). This situation is changing gradually. Following the recommendation of 
the European Union, the German government decided in 2005 to develop external 
3 In France, parental leave is six months for each parent with one child. For parents with at least 
two children, parental leave is two years for one parent and one year for the other. As only 
4 percent of fathers take parental leave in France, in practice this amounts to six months for the 
fi rst child and two years starting from the second child, for the vast majority of families (data for 
2013, OECD 2016).
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childcare and to encourage mothers to work. Parental allowance is only paid for 
one year so as to attract mothers back to the workforce after one year (rather than 
three). This requires the availability of childcare provision. Therefore, the German 
government extended fi nancial support for daycare services for children under the 
age of three in 2005. 
In conclusion, structure – defi ned here as laws and political reforms, resulting 
from a given cultural setting, and formed over decades – matters in both countries. 
The process of stabilisation or change of a given cultural setting is caused by its 
strong interaction with politics and behaviour. These settings in turn establish a 
certain gender culture and family conceptions. 
3 Theoretical Considerations and Hypotheses
3.1 Theoretical background
Recently, the most popular approach in trying to explain changes and differences in 
family lives has been the rational choice framework. Despite successfully explain-
ing some patterns, such as high fertility in countries with good public childcare as 
a result of low opportunity costs, other fi ndings remain unclear in the context of 
this theory, such as persistant gender differences in the distribution of housework 
despite equal contributions to the household income (e.g. Aassve et al. 2014). In-
stitutional approaches (e.g. Pfau-Effi nger 2004, 1996) offer explanations for cross-
national differences complementing structural with cultural arguments. We fi nd this 
useful, and therefore employ the concept of role models for our comparison. The 
term “role model” is used in the sense of a “guiding image”, derived from the Ger-
man “Leitbild”, meaning “an idea or a conception of how things in a certain con-
text should be, work, or look like.” (Lück et al. 2017: 64). The “role model” concept 
develops existing approaches further by describing cultural characteristics as sets 
of collectively shared conceptions and images of a “normal” status or process, in 
the sense that these are widespread, socially expected or personally desired. In 
this context, role models are to be seen as a “bundle of socially shared (mental 
or verbalised) conceptions of a desired or desirable and principally achievable fu-
ture which are supposed to be realised by corresponding action” (Giesel 2007: 245; 
translated by the authors). Role models may thus refer to family issues, such as the 
“normal” composition of a family or the “perfect” timing of when to have children. 
They are “typical societal ideal representations, norms and values regarding the 
family and the societal integration of women and men” (Pfau-Effi nger 2004: 382). 
As we show, this defi nition is applicable in empirical research.
A role model can affect individual behaviour in three ways (Lück et al. 2017): 
(1) by the actor’s motivation to put personal desires into practice (such as attitudes, 
preferences, or values), (2) by the motivation to fulfi l social expectations and to 
avoid social exclusion (such as prescriptive norms referring to social pressure), and 
(3) by the unrefl ected following of routines or social practices in order to save time 
and effort (such as frames and scripts taken as common and self-evident; reducing 
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complexity in decision-making). However, the concept of role models assumes that 
conceptions of normality mostly fulfi l all three criteria simultaneously and that the 
criteria are interdependent. In this sense, the “role model” framework is more com-
plex than most cultural concepts. 
This also implies that role models take hold on both the micro and macro level. 
They are micro-level phenomena, because every individual has their own role mod-
els, which might differ from the role models of others. Therefore, differences in 
family-related behaviour can be explained on the micro level, referring to personal 
or individual role models. However, role models also tend to be shared by individu-
als within a society or a social group, and therefore can explain differences in be-
haviour on the macro level as collective or cultural role models.
These two types of role models simultaneously infl uence behaviour alongside 
rational refl ection and decision-making, as well as in interaction with each other. 
However, individuals are not necessarily aware that they are following role mod-
els. They may well consider their behaviour to be the result of a personal decision 
(Rossier/Bernardi 2009). The infl uence of role models reproduces and stabilises the 
common patterns of family life and decelerates social change (such as the conver-
gence of gender roles). Their infl uence is similar to norms which are one aspect of 
role models. Prescriptive and proscriptive norms – rigid expectations about how to 
behave and how not to behave, respectively – stabilise a social situation whereas 
permissive norms – allowances of certain behaviour – favour social change (Ber-
nardi 2013). The wide acceptance of births outside marriage in France is an example 
of the latter. 
In our comparison, we assume that role models at the individual and societal 
level differ between France and Germany and between the two German regions – 
East and West. Explanations for these differences arise from structural differences 
and historical developments, which affected role models through different norms 
of childlessness, large families, gender, and partnership. The policy settings and 
their facets of pronatalism, conservatism and individualism in France and Germany 
should help to explain the differences in family-related norms. Therefore, we focus 
on individual role models on the one hand, and on perceived opinions in society on 
the other.
3.2 Hypotheses
3.2.1 Family size-related factors
Differing family sizes are one cause of the different fertility levels in France and 
Germany. Regarding the distribution by parity, the most striking differences be-
tween France and the two parts of Germany involve the occurrence of childlessness 
and of large families. Based on our theoretical concept, there should be particular 
role models within each region. It is not possible to relate role models and fertility 
outcomes over time with the available data, thus we focus on individual fertility 
intentions instead. This allows us to relate role models and the intended number of 
children in the current structural context in which these intentions are formed. 
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We assume that in all three regions individuals are convinced of their personal 
role models and live according to them, which leads to the psychological effect of 
a reduction of dissonance between ideals and real life. Therefore, individuals who 
wish to remain childless are assumed to consider childlessness as something nor-
mal, while individuals who want to have at least three children see large families 
in a positive light. Conversely, the respective opposing intention is rejected (H1a). 
We further expect that intended childlessness is perceived as being accepted on a 
societal level in West Germany and to a lesser extent also in East Germany, but not 
socially accepted in France (H1b). Conversely, we assume that large families are 
socially accepted in France, whereas in West Germany and even more so in East 
Germany they are not (H1c).
3.2.2 Partnership-related factors
Traditional values (attitudes towards marriage and gender roles)
Another differentiating factor between the regions under study is the lower share 
of births out of wedlock in West Germany compared to France and East Germany, 
pointing to a higher appreciation of traditional values within partnerships. In West 
Germany, we therefore expect intended childlessness to be closely correlated with 
a rejection of marriage and traditional gender role models on the individual level. In 
France and East Germany on the other hand, no correlation should be visible (H2a). 
We further assume that the appreciation of marriage and traditional gender role 
models is combined with a higher intended fi nal parity, i.e. three or more children, 
as having many children matches the traditional way of life in all three regions (H2b).
Financial security
The impact of family policy is explored by accounting for the importance given to 
fi nancial security in the context of partnership. With this indirect and rather crude 
measure, we attempt to capture the fact that fi nancial security should be less im-
portant if families can rely on government support. In France, when individuals con-
sider whether or not they want to have children, and if so how many, we expect less 
weight attached to their fi nancial situation due to generous state aid. Nevertheless, 
the start of a family is a crucial point, because fi nancial aid is only paid from the 
second child onwards. If there is any impact of fi nancial security, it should take hold 
at the transition to the fi rst child. In Germany, aid is less generous, and we there-
fore expect individuals to attach greater importance to personal fi nancial security 
(H3a). These two expectations should also hold as societal opinions in the respec-
tive countries (H3b).
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4 Data, methods and operationalisation
The German survey “Family-related Leitbilder” (FLB) was carried out in 2012 by the 
Federal Institute for Population Research (BiB) as a telephone survey.4 The target 
population were people living in Germany between the ages of 20 and 39. It was 
designed to explore cultural aspects related to family issues and consisted of 5,000 
respondents (3,986 in West Germany, 1,014 in East Germany). The French survey 
“Marital status, fertility intentions and family opinions” was conducted in 2013 as 
a pilot study carried out on tablets, as part of the ELIPSS panel (Longitudinal In-
ternet Studies for Social Sciences).5 The sample was far smaller, 340 cases for the 
age group of 18-40-year-olds. The comparability of the two surveys is challenging 
with regard to sampling methods and general aims. Nevertheless, we have the ad-
vantage of similar questions on role models in both surveys, because parts of the 
original German survey were directly translated and implemented into the French 
panel. Both samples are weighted for socio-economic factors (Lück et al. 2013; Pi-
lorin/Legleye 2018).
Our data offer new perspectives for comparing France and Germany regarding 
their family-related role models. They also offer a new method to operationalise the 
measurement of general opinion. For this purpose, we asked questions on two dif-
ferent levels: fi rst, personal opinions of the respondent on family-related topics, and 
then the perception of societal norms on the same topic. In practice, this means that 
respondents were fi rst asked about their personal opinion on an item, e.g. “Nowa-
days it is normal not to have children, do you personally agree?”6, and in a second 
step, they were asked “And what does the general public think about this topic?” 
The same response scale was used for both questions (Lück et al. 2013).
We chose items covering the issues of childlessness, large families, and part-
nership for our research question on the impact of family-related role models on 
fertility intentions. These items will be introduced in detail in the next section. In our 
operationalisation, we linked role models to fertility intentions and thereby compare 
groups with different fi nal intended parity. Following Hagewen and Morgan (2005), 
we interpreted fertility intentions as a “proximate determinant” of actual behaviour, 
fully aware of the fact that it is not certain whether intentions will ultimately be 
realised. Since the data only offer a limited number of items to compare, we used 
single items as proxies for role models. We defi ne fi nal intended parity as the num-
ber of children a respondent already has plus the number of (additional) intended 
children plus pregnancies at the time of the interview (see e.g. Sobotka 2009; Lief-
broer 2009). The non-response rate was high in the French survey, which reduced 
our sample size further.7 This might be due to the tablet survey design in France or 
4 http://www.bib.bund.de/EN/Research/FB1_Family/FG11_Leitbild/fg11_node.html
5 https://cdsp.sciences-po.fr/en/ressources-en-ligne/ressource/fr.cdsp.ddi.elipss.2013.11.familles/
6 We used 4-level Likert items with the following choice of answers: “fully agree; rather agree; 
rather disagree; totally disagree”.
7 See respective models.
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due to the fact that the items were originally designed for German respondents only. 
Therefore, we decided to analyse strongly reduced multivariate models controlling 
only for age, sex, partnership, and educational level. Furthermore, we dichotomized 
the opinion items in order to keep the number of cells in the model small enough to 
obtain stable results. We compared childless persons who wish to remain childless, 
persons with fi nal intended parity one, and persons with fi nal intended parity three 
or more with the most widely-intended two-child family. The French data allow for 
the exclusion of infertile persons, while this is not possible for the German data. 
As the sample size for Germany is much larger, the distortions due to this lack of 
information should be smaller than if it would have been the case for France. Due to 
the small sample size of the French survey, we calculated two models, one for the 
infl uence of family-related items and one for partnership-related items. 
5 Descriptive comparison – cultural dimensions of childlessness, 
large families and partnership 
Our fi ndings (Table 1) confi rm that childlessness seems to be accepted by individu-
als and perceived as unexceptional on the societal level in Germany. Surprisingly, 
we do not fi nd great differences between the two German regions, although they 
differ greatly in the occurrence of childlessness (Fig. 2). In France on the other hand, 
it seems that respondents accept childlessness to a greater extent on the individual 
level than on the perceived societal level. However, the acceptance is signifi cantly 
lower than in Germany in each case. The picture changes for the other extreme, the 
evaluation of large families (defi ned as three or more children), which was probed 
using the statement “it is wonderful to have many children.” In France, large families 
seem to be widely accepted as something normal, not extraordinary. About half of 
the population agrees that having many children is wonderful. In Germany, on the 
other hand, there is a wide gap between individual and perceived societal accept-
ance. Large families are viewed positively on the individual level but are perceived 
to be not accepted at the societal level, and are moreover only regarded as an ac-
ceptable option for those parents who can cover the expenses. Indeed, large fami-
lies are often stigmatised as being fi nancially needy and for living on social welfare 
(Diabaté et al. 2015). In France, large families may be more widely accepted due to 
signifi cant and long-standing institutional support. We also fi nd differences within 
Germany. Larger families are more common in West than in East Germany. This fact 
is mirrored by the appreciation at the individual level: Approval of large families is 
greater in West than in East Germany. Finally, fi nancial constraints for large families 
matter in Germany, whereas in France the notion of equal opportunities places the 
fi nancial burden on the state in the eyes of the respondents. 
The fi nancial situation is also important when it comes to partnership. A good 
fi nancial situation is more commonly perceived as a key to the success of a partner-
ship in Germany than in France. However, the most prominent difference between 
the two countries is the importance given to children in the context of partnerships. 
Partnership seems to be much more strongly linked to children in Germany (both 
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parts) than in France. Furthermore, there seems to be no strong difference between 
the countries when taking the acceptance of marriage as an indicator of tradition-
alism. However, the question of whether the man should take decisions in case 
of doubt reveals strong differences on the individual level, indicating that there is 
more equality in couples’ decision-making in France.
6 Associations between role models and fertility intentions 
In our next step, we link role models to fertility intentions using fi nal intended parity 
as the dependent variable, and compare these groups to their role models. Due to 
different sample sizes, we fi nd more signifi cant effects for Germany than for France 
when comparing the infl uence of family-related items (Table 2). The data are cross-
sectional, so no causal effects can be deduced. The correlations relate current fertil-
ity intentions to current role models and show that there is an interrelation, though 
we cannot tell if there is a temporal aspect, i.e. whether one determines the other.
6.1 Family size-related factors
We expected to fi nd a strong link between individual intentions and the correspond-
ing opinion on role models. For Germany, this hypothesis is confi rmed, i.e. individu-
als who wish to stay childless perceive childlessness as normal, while those who 
wish to have larger families perceive this as an acceptable route. Contrary to this, 
in France individuals who wish to remain childless do not consider childlessness 
as normal and also perceive their own intentions as being contrary to the broader 
social norm. This fi nding is similar to the outcomes of a qualitative study conducted 
by Charlotte Debest (2014, see also Debest/Mazuy 2014). The fact that we do not 
fi nd any signifi cant differences between the groups with different fertility intentions 
when it comes to the general norms about childlessness in France further confi rms 
this fi nding. There seems to be a general social consensus that childlessness is un-
desirable, which is related to negative external circumstances, i.e. not having a part-
ner, job-related constraints, or medical problems (Salles et al. 2010). The results are 
very different for Germany. In East and West, childless persons regard their life plan 
as normal, but perceive childlessness as not accepted in society more broadly. The 
same applies to persons with fi nal intended parity one in West Germany. However, 
we fi nd a different situation in East Germany, where one-child families are more fre-
quent and are not seen as violating an accepted norm or role model. Regarding the 
appreciation of large families, our hypotheses on the individual level are confi rmed 
in all three regions. The desire to have a large family is strongly correlated with the 
individual appreciation of children. In Germany, this hypothesis is also confi rmed 
the other way around, i.e. persons not wanting to have children or only one child are 
personally not in favour of large families. We already found this relationship in the 
descriptive results (Table 1), where large families seem to be a highly controversial 
topic in both parts of Germany. Persons wanting large families see no societal sup-
port for their intentions, whereas those who do not want any children think large 
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families are rather appreciated. While our fi ndings support hypotheses H1b and H1c 
on the acceptance of childlessness and large families, H1a on the conformity of in-
dividual intentions and role models can only be confi rmed for Germany.
6.2 Partnership-related factors
Regarding the infl uence of partnership-related items on fertility decisions, we again 
fi nd different cultures in France and Germany. The belief that fi nancial security is 
important for the functioning of a partnership closely correlates with not wanting 
children in France. In contrast, individuals with fi nal intended parity one reject the 
importance of fi nancial security. This also applies to West German respondents 
who want three or more children. This may be explained as a statement of attaching 
greater importance to the goal of having children than to fi nancial security in both 
regions. In West Germany, the same group, i.e. people wanting a large family, opts 
for the man to take the leading role in a partnership, which can be interpreted as a 
more traditional idea of partnership. 
Another important difference between both countries is that children and part-
nership are less strongly linked in France than in Germany. This is observable in 
both the descriptive results and the control variables, where having no partner is a 
strong determinant for intending to remain childless in both parts of Germany, but 
not in France. In East and West Germany, we fi nd a strong rejection by individuals 
who want to stay childless of the idea that a partnership needs children in order to 
stabilise. Conversely, the reference group, i.e. respondents wanting two children, 
support the notion of children contributing to stable partnerships. This is also what 
individuals who want to stay childless perceive as a social norm in society. If having 
children is closely linked to the societal notion of a “good” partnership, then the pre-
conditions for having children are different from France. If the connection between 
partnership and parenthood was seen as less strong by Germans, individuals might 
have children with a partner despite not being sure whether the partnership will 
last. An explanation for this different situation may be found in the fact that some 
parental benefi ts were legally linked to marriage in Germany for a long time. This 
legal link has been removed in recent years, i.e. children born out of wedlock now 
have the same rights as children born in a marriage, but the link remains strong as 
a role model. The strong link between partnership and children in Germany also 
reveals that fi nancial constraints may be stronger than in France. The risk of falling 
into poverty when raising children as a single parent is higher in Germany than in 
France (Jaehrling et al. 2011). Finally, in both parts of Germany the group of inten-
tionally childless persons is also characterised by their rejection of marriage, which 
supports the assumption of a strong link between marriage and children.  Here, we 
fi nd a signifi cant difference between East and West Germany. Individuals wanting 
only one child reject marriage in East Germany, whereas in West Germany the di-
viding line seems to be that of wanting to have children at all. We interpret this as 
confi rmation of the historically stronger separation of marriage and children in East 
Germany, where having one child does not necessarily imply marriage, as we ex-
plained in section 2.1.
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The results concerning the importance of marriage in West Germany compared 
to France and East Germany support H2a, but H2b is only confi rmed for West Ger-
many. We also did not fi nd any well-founded evidence for the greater importance 
of fi nancial security in Germany, i.e. for H3a and H3b. However, as hypothesized, 
fi nancial problems seem to be an obstacle for parenthood in France, as fi nancial aid 
only starts from the second child onwards. 
7 Discussion
In this study, we aimed to close a research gap in explaining differences in fertility 
between France and Germany by applying a cultural concept of role models on a 
personal as well as societal level. In line with our hypotheses, we found role models 
suggesting different fertility cultures in France and Germany, whereas the differenc-
es between the two German regions were less pronounced than expected. In both 
countries, we fi nd a strong two-child family norm. Furthermore, family formation in 
France seems to be easier and more self-evident, with fewer structural and cultural 
barriers than in Germany. However, the decision to start a family at all seems to be 
easier in Germany. We did not fi nd many differences between East and West Ger-
many, except for a higher rejection of large families and greater support for single-
child families in East Germany, which we expected because of a longer tradition of 
smaller families in the former GDR.
Regarding key features of fertility, the recognition of childlessness as a role mod-
el varies widely between the two countries. In Germany, childlessness seems to 
be an accepted way of living, unlike in France. Although there seems to be some 
acceptance at the individual level, childlessness is perceived as being contrary to 
the broader societal norm. This even leads to a sort of self-stigmatisation of indi-
viduals who do not intend to have children themselves. Another demographic key 
factor showing opposing results in the examined countries are large families. There 
seems to be general acceptance in France, whereas in Germany the situation is 
highly controversial. Large families are individually accepted as a role model, but 
are perceived as stigmatised in society. As a common feature in both countries, the 
intention to have a large family is mainly based on strong individual convictions 
which, in the case of Germany, even outrank fi nancial concerns. Financial security 
is broadly associated with having a family in Germany and therefore is one basis of 
the role model. Another German peculiarity in comparison to France is the strong 
link between partnership and parenthood. The notion that parenthood must be em-
bedded in a well-functioning, stable partnership seems to be stronger in Germany 
than in France. This interdependence may pose a barrier to start and extend a fam-
ily. This also applies to the fact that having a family seems to be strongly associated 
with a traditional living arrangement for some groups, for whom this traditional 
arrangement is an unattractive option. To avoid this situation, they may prefer to 
remain childless. 
Exploring these role models helps us understand the demographic situations in 
France and Germany, because they may infl uence personal decisions. Furthermore, 
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they demonstrate the interdependence of cultural and structural factors. We are 
speaking of interdependence insofar as there is no direction in terms of cause and 
effect between incidence and social acceptance but a clear mutual dependency. A 
high percentage of large families in a society enhances their acceptance and makes 
them an eligible choice, as in France. A lower percentage has the opposite effect, 
which is true for East Germany, where the low occurrence of large families is con-
nected to a negative image. The same applies to childlessness in France. Another 
aspect in this context are preconditions individuals associate with having a family, 
namely a solid fi nancial basis and a stable partnership. While an uncertain fi nancial 
situation may be a hindrance for founding a family in France, in Germany an unsta-
ble partnership could play this role.
We differentiated between role models on the individual and on the societal level. 
Usually, individuals are familiar with the role models of the society they live in and 
accept and follow them. When societal norms and individual behaviour differ, there 
are various ways to react: Individuals may be convinced of their personal role mod-
els and act on them. In West Germany, this concerns all groups who are outside the 
two-child-norm, i.e. individuals who want to remain childless, who want one child or 
three children or more. Their intentions are consistent with their personal role mod-
els, but they believe that society in general thinks differently. The same holds true 
for East Germany, except for individuals wanting one child, which can be explained 
by a strong general role model of one-child families in this region. Generally, these 
attitudes reveal a signifi cant discrepancy between role models at the individual and 
at the societal level, but there is also a strong link between fertility intentions and 
individual perceptions. Individuals consider themselves as acting against the social 
norm, but nonetheless appreciate their own role models. In France, the situation is 
different: For individuals with no fertility intentions, role models at the individual 
and at the societal level are consistent, but oppose their personal intentions, which 
seems to be contradictory. This highlights the prominence of one overarching role 
model of having at least two children (in France), in contrast to one dominant and 
several less central role models (in Germany). 
The way individuals react to non-corresponding role models shows signifi cant 
cultural differences between Germany and France. In Germany, there seems to be a 
more individualistic approach. Individual role models are stronger than societal role 
models, which leads to a higher occurrence and consequently a higher acceptance 
of different family forms in general. However, it also leads to a higher distinction 
on the individual level, as everyone has to justify their choice of living arrangement 
in light of many possibilities. This results in more exclusive subgroups in society 
which may be an indicator for a segmentation of German society into separate fami-
ly milieus, with little mutual appreciation. By contrast, we fi nd a rather homogenous 
picture in France, indicating a more socialistic attitude. There seems to be one com-
prehensive dominating role model, namely that having children is self-evidently a 
good thing: childlessness is considered contrary to the societal norm; hence this 
role model may put pressure on people who are not sure whether they want to have 
children or not. 
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This study highlights the importance of role models in fertility intentions and 
outcomes. Furthermore, it emphasizes the relevance of family role models prevail-
ing in a given society when studying the link between institutional frameworks and 
fertility decisions. Thus, we provide new deep insights into the fertility cultures 
in France, East and West Germany. However, as our databases were two cross-
sectional surveys which differ in size and implementation, further research is neces-
sary. International comparable panel data is needed to further investigate the causal 
relationships between role models and fertility behaviour.
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